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Abstract The eclipse of Darwinism began to end in the
1980s and hangs in the balance today. We need an
Extended Synthesis, using “extension” metaphorically. We
must extend back in time to recover important aspects of
Darwinism that were set aside, and then lost during neo-
Darwinism, then move forward beyond neo-Darwinism to
encompass new data and concepts. The most comprehen-
sive framework for the Extended Synthesis is the Major
Transitions in Evolution. The Extended Synthesis rests
comfortably within a philosophical perspective in which
biology does not need to be connected with other areas of
science in order to justify itself. I am attracted to an older
concept in which biology needs a covering law to connect it
with the rest of the natural sciences. Darwin implicated a
“higher law,” but did not specify it. If we can elucidate that
law, the Extended Synthesis will become the Unified Theory
of Biology called for by Brooks and Wiley 25 years ago.
Keywords Extended synthesis . Neo-Darwinism .
Darwinism . Complexity
We are Man the Hunted, descendants of primates whose
cleverness, combined with caution and suspicion, allowed
us to survive long enough to begin making the weapons
evolution neglected to provide. Once we successfully tested
those weapons on species that recently had been fellow
prey, we styled ourselves Man the Hunter. At this point, the
first elements of self-awareness and its adaptive correlate,
denial, emerged. Our suspicious, cautious nature became
canalized into superstition, especially relating to the
meaning of life and death.
By 1982, the centenary of Darwin’s death, Niles
Eldredge and Steven J. Gould had catalyzed a loosely
connected group of evolutionary biologists unhappy with
the New Synthesis to unleash a cascade of criticisms and
proposals. Emboldened by this display of the scientific
community at its meritocratic best, Ed Wiley and I entered
the fray. The day we finished proofreading Evolution as
Entropy, David Hull presciently warned us the fun was
over. Soon, I received an envelope from a friend who had
seen a manuscript on a colleague’s desk. Such privileged
material is rarely copied and forwarded. My friend wrote, “I
think you and Ed should know what you’re up against.”
The privately circulated manuscript was authored by three
academics at the University of California-Berkeley. Ed and
I were stunned by its vicious tone. Why the rhetorical heat?
If we were wrong, embarrassed silence would have
sufficed. Perhaps we were right, but those in power could
not gain credit for themselves by acknowledging us as the
formulators—we were young; we were not population
geneticists or mathematicians; we were not at powerful
institutions; and we had no powerful advocates.
In contrast to the prevailing Kuhnian social model of
scientific change, Hull (1988) proposed that most scientists,
regardless of age, don’t like new ideas, even ones that
support their own worldview (“I already know that, why do
I need this?”). They will fight to keep new ideas from
becoming accepted unless they benefit their own careers.
Ambitious scientists denounce new ideas, co-opting them
once the originators have been frightened into silence or to
marginal publication outlets (e.g., Brooks 1990, 1992,
1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001a, b, 2002; Brooks
and McLennan 1990, 1991, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2011).
Eldredge’s (1985, 1995) fundamental findings about the
nature of the New Synthesis were equally bold—it had all
the trappings of a marriage of convenience and none of the
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appearances of a consensual union. Thus, the status quo
reaction to punctuated equilibrium and the other new ideas
was a defense of a sociological arrangement, not of a set of
scientific principles.
Hull and Eldredge have largely been proven correct. For
example, a prominent ecologist and biogeographer stated in
1986 that Evolution as Entropy collapsed by virtue of the
fact that it was absurd to believe there were any
phylogenetic influences in ecology and behavior. Phylogeny,
Ecology and Behavior (Brooks and McLennan 1991)
documented the pervasive phylogenetic influences on all
levels of ecology and behavior, stimulating a decade of
research substantiating Brooks and Wiley’s assertions about
historical ecology (Brooks and McLennan 2002). Yet, none
of that was seen as corroborating a bold prediction by
Brooks and Wiley; rather, the ideas have been co-opted into
“the Synthesis” (“we’ve always believed this”). I think Hull’s
and Eldredge’s assessments were correct but incomplete,
because they focused on the rational behavior of the critics.
And yet, the reactions were also emotional. At times, people
denouncing these new ideas argued against their own
published work. So, it was not scientific disagreements but
superstition and fear, fear that the new ideas were correct,
driving the reactions. What had we—punctuationists, cladists,
entropists—done?
I believe we provoked an atavistic reaction to death. We
used the centenary of Darwin’s death to call for radical change
in evolutionary theory. Fellow academics instinctively
recoiled from the symbolism of the death of a leader or a
religion, fearing chaos and violence would ensue until a new
warlord or god appeared to restore order and worrying that
the new emergent order would diminish the influence of
those previously in power.
To 2009—200 years since Darwin’s birth, 150 years
since publication of Origin of Species. Again, there are calls
for changes in evolutionary theory. This time, the calls are
met with celebration—we almost beg for an Extended
Synthesis, some new and fresh framework that allows us to
celebrate our legacy and add new findings to it. The lack of
negative emotion may reflect the co-opting and rebranding
of controversial concepts suggested by Brooks and Wiley,
Eldredge and Gould, and many others. But again, I think
this is an incomplete explanation because it does not
explain the positive emotion, which I believe is linked to
1982, through a second atavistic reaction—new life from
old, the continuation of life, the extension of life into the
future, even notions of renewal and resurrection. Humans
have long balanced on the knife’s edge between under-
standing personal mortality and deciding to live and
reproduce. It’s no surprise that the person who changed
Darwinism into the much more optimistic neo-Darwinism
was Herbert Spencer, deeply committed to racial, social,
and economic concepts of human-driven progress. But, as
John Maynard Smith constantly reminded evolutionists,
there are no benefits without costs. That is,
The concept of progress acts as a protective mechanism
to shield us from the terrors of the future.—Herbert
1965: 321.
I studied the development of evolutionary biology as a
scientist searching for critical errors in my thinking.
Eldredge (1985, 1995) provided the key; Darwinism and
neo-Darwinism differ on a number of important issues. Had
I been attacking the wrong target, believing that neo-
Darwinism was wholly Darwinian, throwing the baby out
with the bath water?
Back to the Origin
If a colleague publishes more than once on a topic, we cite
the most recent version. Consequently, I cite the sixth
edition of the Origin. Effective scientists also write
according to the formula, “Tell them what you’re going to
tell them; tell them; tell them what you told them.” Many
discussions of Darwinism begin with the final sentence of
the sixth chapter of the Origin
Hence in fact the law of the Conditions of Existence
is the higher law; as it includes, through the
inheritance of former adaptations, that of Unity of
Type. (Darwin 1872: 195)
Is this Darwin’s thesis that natural selection is the higher
law of biology? The statement comes late in the game (“tell
them what you’ve told them”). Prior to it are many pages of
empirical information supporting his thesis (“tell them...”),
so his thesis (“Tell them what you’re going to tell them...”)
should be near the beginning, perhaps in the second
paragraph of the book
There are two factors: namely, the nature of the
organism and the nature of the conditions. The former
seems to be much more the important; for nearly
similar variations sometimes arise under, as far as we
can judge, dissimilar conditions; and, on the other
hand, dissimilar variations arise under conditions which
appear to be nearly uniform. (Darwin 1872: 32)
Darwin’s conception of the Nature of the Organism was
explicit: it is in the nature of the organism to produce
offspring; to produce offspring similar but not identical to
each other; to transmit those similarities and differences to
their offspring; and to act in their own behalf.
The most important point is that these capacities of the
nature of the organism obtained regardless of the Nature of
the Conditions. This is Darwin’s Necessary Mismatch
(Brooks and Hoberg 2007; Brooks 2010a, b; Brooks and
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McLennan 2011). Without a high degree of autonomy from
the nature of the conditions, there would be no reproductive
overrun, no struggle for survival, no natural selection. For
Darwin, natural selection was the outcome of conflicts
created a priori by the conditions of existence. It was not
the higher law, but one consequence of it. The final
paragraph of the sixth chapter of the Origin supplies the
essential context
It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings
have been formed on two great laws [my italics]—
unity of type and the conditions of existence... On my
theory, unity of type is explained by unity of descent.
The expression [my italics] of conditions of existence...
is fully embraced by the principle of natural selection...
Hence in fact the law [my italics] of the Conditions of
Existence is the higher law; as it includes, through the
inheritance of former adaptations, that of Unity of
Type. (Darwin 1872: 194–195)
The higher law governs the conditions of existence, the sum
of interactions between the nature of the organism and the
nature of the conditions. Darwin used “conditions” in two
different ways. The “nature of the conditions” and “expression
of the conditions of existence” refer to material elements in the
surroundings, synonymous with current use of “environment,”
the material circumstances in which conflicts of interest
between organisms take place (Maynard Smith and Szathmàry
1995). The “law of the conditions of existence” is more
broadly conceptual, even metaphorical.
This perspective emphasizes how unusual Darwinism
was. Darwin postulated that evolution was not a process per
se, but was an outcome of interactions between two classes
of phenomena, each following their own rules yet spatially
and temporally entwined. Furthermore, the two classes of
phenomena were not co-equal, one was more important
than the other. And yet, it is the “greater” phenomenon that
inevitably creates conflict, while it is the “lesser” that leads
to resolutions of those conflicts. If Darwin were writing
today, he would write of complex systems behavior, but in
his day and age, it seemed incoherent, muddled, and overly
complicated. There were many attempts to “fix” the theory,
reaching a crescendo during The Eclipse of Darwinism in
1890–1940 (Bowler 1983). Chief among the competitors
were neo-Lamarckism, which proposed that all evolution
was due to the influence of the “nature of the conditions,”
and Orthogenesis, which proposed that all evolution was
due to the influence of the “nature of the organism.”
Origins of Neo-Darwinism
Bowler declared that the end of the eclipse of Darwinism
began with the rise of neo-Darwinism in the 1920s. I
suggest that the eclipse began with Herbert Spencer.
Stocking (1983) noted that, by 1871, among anthropolo-
gists and sociologists at least, “evolution” was synony-
mous with progressive historical sequences, and Spencer
interpreted the principle of natural selection as a progres-
sivist phenomenon, in which the fittest were those who
achieved a better “fit” to their surroundings and thus out-
competed their rivals. As “survival of the fittest” gained
popularity, E. D. Cope, an American neo-Lamarckian,
raised the following question (Cope 1887): “If evolution is
survival of the fittest, what explains the origin of the
fittest?” Cope believed only Lamarckian mechanisms
could account for the origin of the fittest. Darwinians
would have dismissed Cope’s arguments because evolu-
tion was not survival of the fittest but survival of the
adequate (Darwin explained in the sixth edition of the
Origin that not all “adaptations” [functions] were evolu-
tionarily significant, and no one should make the mistake
of equating fitness with adaptation: Brooks and McLennan
2002). Spencerians responded by making natural selection
a creative process. By inextricably linking “fitness” and
“progress” and thus “adaptation” and “progress” (later
“optimality”), natural selection could be construed as a
creative process “progressively” eliminating all less than
maximally fit traits. The most effective early proponent of
this view was August Weismann, whose ideas traditional
Darwinians of the last decade of the nineteenth century
derided as “neo-Darwinism” (Hull 1988). If natural
selection explained the origin of traits, however, evolu-
tionary theory could be simplified enormously. George
Gaylord Simpson (1944) characterized natural selection as
a sculptor. With his metaphor of a formless block of
marble, Simpson showed the fundamental difference
between Darwinism and neo-Darwinism with respect to
the nature of the organism. Traditional Darwinians would
have characterized different lineages of inheritance as the
sculptors and natural selection as more of an art critic.
For Darwin, inheritance, being largely autonomous from
the details of the conditions, introduced historical contin-
gency into evolutionary explanations. This perspective was
consistent with a Humean interpretation of history as a
series of causal events that may influence on the future
without assuming the future is pre-determined. This is the
reason the Origin includes a picture of a phylogenetic tree
indicating open-ended diversification anchored by common
ancestry, shown through inheritance. Being progressivist,
neo-Darwinism fit well with the view that history is a
passive record of the emergence of inevitable events.
Morgan (1932) wrote, “...biology is no longer simply a
branch of history. It is now a science.” Having eliminated
the nature of the organism by making selection creative,
neo-Darwinists also killed time by eliminating phylogeny
as explanatory.
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The Hardened Synthesis
By the early 1970s, Steven J. Gould noted a Hardening of
the Synthesis. Eldredge (1985, 1995) eloquently documented
how the hardening led to a simple view of evolution, in
which function follows the nature of the conditions and form
follows function. This blurred the distinction between
Darwinian and Lamarckian explanations. In Evolution as
Entropy, we suggested that neo-Darwinism had become a
sociological label one applied to oneself in order to be
considered acceptably mainstream. I present next some
statements about evolution I’ve read or heard in the past
30 years (some in the past six months) by self-described
neo-Darwinians, preceded by Darwin’s views in the sixth
edition of the Origin:
(1) Evolution is the interplay of the nature of the
organism and the nature of the conditions, the
nature of the organism being far more important
became evolution is adaptation by random variation
to changing environments;
(2) Phylogeny is a critical part of causal explanations
became phylogeny is a passive record of past selection
events (more recently, analogous to the error term in
an ANOVA model);
(3) Ecology is played out on an evolutionary stage
became evolution is played out on an ecological stage;
(4) Species are real and speciation is caused became
species are not real and speciation is a demographic
accident;
(5) Evolutionary outcomes are generally gradual because
evolution is the net outcome of organisms responding
to many different aspects of the nature of the
conditions (so many selection vectors) became evolu-
tion is inherently gradual;
(6) Fitness space is “sloppy” (Agosta and Klemens 2008);
most evolutionary dynamics are the result of organ-
isms with non-zero fitness wandering through fitness
space became fitness space is highly optimized with
fuzzy boundaries, and organisms do not change fitness
space without eliminating a less fit occupant;
(7) High levels of variation are expected; all variants with
non-zero fitness in the environments in which they are
born survive became high levels of variation are not
expected; the variant with the highest fitness replaces
all others (if there is variation, all variants have the
same fitness);
(8) The conservative nature of inheritance and insensitivity
of reproduction to the nature of the conditions produce
more organisms needing the same resources than there
are resources available became limited environmental
resources create conflicts;
(9) Survival of the adequate became survival of the fittest;
(10) Survival is paramount (he who lives longest wins)
became optimality is paramount (he who dies with
the best toys wins).
Ending the Eclipse: Extending in Two Directions
The eclipse of Darwinism began to end in the 1980s and
hangs in the balance today. We need an Extended
Synthesis, using “extension” metaphorically. We must
extend back in time to recover important aspects of
Darwinism that were set aside, then lost during neo-
Darwinism, then move forward beyond neo-Darwinism to
encompass new data and concepts (see also Szathmáry
2006). Three proposals consistent with the goal of ending
the eclipse are: The Hierarchy View (Eldredge 1985, 1995):
Living systems are simultaneously part of an informational
(production) hierarchy of replicators and information flow
(the Genealogical Hierarchy—Nature of the Organism) and
an energetic (exchanges) hierarchy of interactors and
energy flow (the Ecological Hierarchy—Nature of the
Conditions). The Information View (Brooks and Wiley
1988): irreversibility in biological systems (reproduction,
ontogeny, evolution) results from entropic increases in
biological information, constrained by intrinsic (inheritance
system informational dynamics—Nature of the Organism)
and extrinsic (selection—Nature of the Conditions) cohesive
properties. The Evolutionary Transitions View (Maynard
Smith and Szathmàry 1995): Evolutionary Transitions
increase the efficiency of storing and transmitting informa-
tion (Nature of the Organism), thereby enhancing organism/
environment interactions (Nature of the Conditions). The last
is the most comprehensive framework relative to an
Extended Synthesis; there is even a teaching text available
(Maynard Smith and Szathmàry 1999).
The Extended Synthesis rests comfortably within a
philosophical perspective called the Autonomy of Biology—
Biology does not need to be connected with other areas of
science in order to justify itself. I am attracted to an older
concept called the Unity of Science—Biology needs a
covering law to connect it with the rest of the natural
sciences. Darwin implicated a “higher law,” but did not
specify it
“Hence in fact the law [my italics] of the Conditions
of Existence is the higher law...” (Darwin 1872: 195)
I believe that if we can elucidate that covering law, the
Extended Synthesis will become the Unified Theory of
Biology called for by Brooks and Wiley (1986, 1988).
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